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CHAPTER 9 
Contracts 
GORDON L. DOERFER 
§9.1. Introduction. Although the law of contracts is not ex-
pected to be a fast-breaking frontier of judicial activity, several de-
cisions rendered during the 1971 SURVEY year offer an opportunity for 
some reflection and critical analysis. Two decisions of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, Mcinerney v. Massasoit Greyhound Association 1 and 
Trustees of Tufts College v. Volpe Construction Co., 2 seem especially 
noteworthy because they illustrate the ever-potential conflict between 
the private law of contracts and the public realm of social policies. 
§9.2. Attorney's fee contracts: Judicial nullification of uncon-
scionable terms. Mcinerney v. Massasoit Greyhound Association 1 
involved a fee contract between an attorney and a client with respect 
to a domestic relations case. The Supreme Judicial Court held that 
the contract, which provided for payment of a contingent fee and for 
an assignment by the client to the attorney of certain stock, was ex-
cessive and unreasonable as a matter of law, and consequently null 
and void. The Court explicitly adopted the principle that the fee 
arrangements made by attorneys with their clients are subject to 
judicial scrutiny, and that attorneys are not free to make any bargain 
without regard to its reasonableness. The Court's decision had its 
roots not only in the special interest of the Court in regulating the 
practice of law, but also in the judicial policy of limiting the power 
of private parties to contract where their mutually agreeable arrange-
ments conflict with social policy. The greatest significance of the 
case was the Court's broad assertion of jurisdiction to review the fee 
contracts made by attorneys. This case is fully discussed in the student 
comment, §9.6 infra. 
§9.3. Enforcement of private contracts that promote public policy: 
Equal opportunity clause. In Trustees of Tufts College v. Volpe 
Construction Co.,1 a case of first impression in the nation, the plain-
tiff Tufts was appealing from an interlocutory decree that had sus-
GoRotN L. DoERFER is a junior partner in Nutter, McClennen & Fish, Boston. 
§9.1. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.667,269N.E.2d211. 
2 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.I477,264N.E.2d676. 
§9.2. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667,269 N.E.2d211. 
§9.3. 1 1970Mass.Adv. Sh.l477, 264 N.E.2d676. 
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tained, without leave to amend, the defendant's demurrer to Tufts' bill 
for declaratory relief, and from a final decree dismissing plaintiff's 
bill. The bill had alleged a construction contract between the plain-
tiff and the defendant (Volpe) for the building of a dormitory, which 
contract, as required by Executive Order No. 11,246,2 contained an 
equal opportunity clause.3 Volpe, under the terms of the clause, was 
not to discriminate in its employment on the dormitory project and 
was to take affirmative steps to ensure that applicants and employees 
were not discriminated against. The contract allegedly also contained 
a promise by Volpe to include the equal opportunity clause in its 
agreements with subcontractors. Of the work force of 90 persons em-
ployed by the defendant on the dormitory, only 6 were minority group 
members (6.7 percent); of the work force of 19 employed by subcon-
tractors, none were minority group members. The bill further alleged 
that if Volpe had complied with its contractual obligations, its work 
force would have contained approximately 20 percent minority em-
ployees; that Volpe had failed to supply correct information as to its 
compliance with the clause; that Tufts had a duty itself to enforce the 
clause; and that "an actual controversy . . . exists . . . as to whether 
defendant has complied with its obligations" under the clause. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decrees of the lower court and 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the equal opportunity 
clause of the contract and that the existence of parallel federal mecha-
nisms to achieve the same social policies did not preclude Tufts from 
enforcing its own contractual rights. 
The defendant had offered nine grounds (eight procedural and one 
substantive) in support of its demurrer. The procedural grounds were: 
( 1) failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (2) 
failure to allege concisely and with certainty sufficient facts to state a 
claim; (3) nonjusticiability of the controversy; (4) lack of standing on 
the part of the plaintiff, in part because the plaintiff had not been 
harmed; (5) lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of 
the bill; (6) failure to pursue the proper contractual remedy; (7) ab-
sence of necessary parties; and (8) mootness. The Court handled the 
first three of the defendant's contentions together. After finding that 
the plaintiff's precision in pleading was sufficient under the circum-
stances, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's allegations stated 
facts showing the existence of an actual, justiciable controversy. In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on those allegations tending 
to show a breach of the contract between the plaintiff and the defen-
2 3 C.F.R. 340 (O:>mp. 1970), which sets forth seven clauses that must be included in 
contracts let by certain organizations that avail themselves of federal funds. 
3 Included in the equal opportunity clause was the following provision: "[The con-
tractor] will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because 
of race ... color ... or national origin ... [and the contractor] will take affirma-
tive action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated during 
employment without regard to their race . . . color . . . or national origin." 1970 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1477, 264 N.E.2d 676, 678. 
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dant, specifically that affirmative action had been promised, that 
affirmative action would have resulted in the hiring of many more 
minority employees than in fact were hired, and that the defendant 
gave the plaintiff "false and misleading" information as to compliance 
with the contract provisions in question. 
The next four grounds were addressed to what the defendant claimed 
was an improper attempt on the part of the plaintiff to act in the place 
of the federal government in enforcing the equal opportunity clause. 
The defendant contended that, as part of the contract, a clause had 
bee:1 included that limited enforcement of the contract to the federal 
government: 
In the event of the Contractor's noncompliance with the Equal 
Opportunity conditions ... , this contract may be cancelled 
... and the Contractor may be declared ineligible for further 
Government contracts,· in accordance with ... Executive Order 
No. 11246 ... , and such other sanctions may be imposed and 
remedies invoked as provided in said Executive Order, or by rule, 
regulation or order of the Secretary of Labor, or as otherwise pro-
vided by law.4 
The Court, however, disagreed with the defendant's conclusion be-
cause the defendant's reading would disregard the right of the uni-
versity to enforce the provisions of the contract it had reached with 
the contractor: 
Because the government may enforce a specific provision under 
the Executive Order does not mean that the University is unable 
to enforce a similar provision .... [T]he University does not 
seek to enforce the terms of the Executive Order but seeks to en-
force the provisions of its contract with the defendant. The fact 
that a specific provision in the contract is covered by a regulation 
of a Federal agency regarding the enforcement of that regulation 
does not deprive the University of the right to enforce the con-
tractual obligations. 5 
The remainder of defendant's procedural points were likewise rejected 
by the Court. Plaintiff was held to have standing because it was seek-
ing a declaration as to its rights under the terms of its own contract; 
subject matter jurisdiction existed because breach of contract and not 
executive order violation per se was at issue; there was no failure to 
comply with the contractual remedy clause because an action for a 
declaration of rights under the contract was not foreclosed thereby; 
and there was no absence of necessary parties because the claimed 
necessary party (the secretary of labor) was not involved in the alleged 
contract breach. The case was declared by the Court not to be moot, on 
the ground that if the contract had been breached, the suit might be 
maintained for damages. 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1477, 1483, 264 N.E.2d 676, 681, citing the defendant's brief. 
5 Id. at 1483-1484,264 N.E.2dat 682. 
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The one substantive ground pressed by the defendant, that Tufts 
was in effect demanding an illegal quota system for the hiring of 
minorities, was no less speedily disposed of. The Court noted that under 
the terms of the contract affirmative action was required on the part 
of the defendant to ensure nondiscriminatory employment, and con-
cluded that the hiring of 6 minority group members out of a work 
force of 90 raised a question as to the existence of affirmative action. 
Executive Order No. 11,246 is the means by which the federal 
government has chosen to regulate the employment practices of that 
part of the construction industry that contracts with owners or de-
velopers who receive federal funds. The order is not legislation but 
is, rather, a directive that regulates the terms and conditions upon 
which federal financial assistance may be granted. It applies only to 
those employers directly involved in federally financed projects. The 
order does not create or lead to the creation of any privity between a 
construction contractor and the federal government, although there 
appears to be no reason why the government might not create such 
privity if it wished. It does subject the contractor to enforcement by 
two parties, the government and the owner or developer, in the event 
that the order is not complied with: the government acting under the 
order and the owner or developer operating under the contract clause. 
In a manner of speaking, the government is, by virtue of the insertion 
of the equal opportunity clause in the construction contract, a third-
party beneficiary under the construction contract. 
The only issue of contract law presented in Tufts College was 
whether the equal opportunity clause had created any contractual 
rights that could be enforced by the plaintiff, that is, whether the 
plaintiff was entitled to assert an interest in the defendant's hiring 
practices and policies by virtue of the inclusion of the equal oppor-
tunity clause in the contract. Tufts College makes it clear that Mas-
sachusetts owners and developers may bargain for and include in a 
construction contract a clause binding the contractor to employ per-
sons without discrimination and to take affirmative action to achieve 
equal employment opportunities. Since the Court in Tufts College 
in no way relied upon the fact that the inclusion of the equal oppor-
tunity clause was mandated by the executive order, the Court's holding 
should be read to embrace not only those covenants in which the 
executive order would be involved, but also any covenant embodying 
legally enforceable social policy. 
The holding in the Tufts College case suggests a new application of 
contra<;t law to the problem of the exclusion of minority groups from 
the construction trades. Large institutional owners or developers such 
as colleges, universities, hospitals, insurance companies, and other 
quasi-public institutions would do well to insist that equal employ-
ment opportunity clauses be included in construction contracts to 
which they are a party. If substantial contracts are at stake and if the 
inclusion of equal opportunity clauses is widespread, nondiscrimina-
tion standards in the construction industry may be significantly raised. 
4
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This may be all the more true if owners and developers take the time 
and energy to hammer out detailed and enforceable provisions aimed 
specifically at achieving equal opportunities. The excuse most often 
relied upon by a contractor in meeting equal opportunity complaints 
is that he depends upon unions to supply him with labor and has 
no control over the practices of unions regarding equal employment 
opportunities. The excuse may not serve well, however, if contractors 
and contractor associations are faced with an increasing number of 
institutional builders who insist on effective equal opportunity 
clauses. The same rationale that would sustain an action by an owner 
to enforce an equal opportunity clause will sustain an equal oppor-
tunity clause bargained for in a collective bargaining contract. The 
only limit is the bargaining power of the party seeking to impose the 
covenant. 
All of these suggested means of attacking the discrimination prob-
lem assume, of course, a market in which at least one party will insist 
upon the inclusion of an equal opportunity clause. It must be noted 
that efforts to date have not been successful, mostly because owners 
and developers have failed to exploit fully their bargaining position. 
§9.4. Formation of a contract: Negotiations falling short of a 
binding agreement. In Graham v. Oman, 1 the plaintiff Graham 
and the defendant cross-appealed from a decree, upon a finding by a 
master, that awarded the plaintiff a recovery for services rendered in 
the development of a shopping center. The plaintiff was a real estate 
broker who originally had acted for the seller in a transaction involving 
certain land purchased by the defendant, a real estate developer. Dur-
ing the negotiations prior to the signing of the purchase and sale 
agreement, the plaintiff and defendant had spoken about having the 
land rezoned for a shopping center. The defendant indicated that if 
the land could be rezoned and a shopping center erected, arrange-
ments might be made for the plaintiff to be the exclusive broker for the 
shopping center. No specific terms or agreements were reached. After 
the land had been purchased, the broker assisted the developer in ob-
taining the necessary zoning reclassifications and, for two years, 
devoted a substantial portion of her time in the interests of developing 
the shopping center. She collected information for the preparation of 
a brochure and called on many prospective tenants, attempting to 
interest them in the project. During the two-year period, the plaintiff 
tried unsuccessfully to get the defendant to sign an exclusive broker-
age agreement. Subsequently, the defendant entered into an exclusive 
brokerage agreement for the shopping center with someone other 
than the plaintiff. The master found that plaintiff's work was of bene-
fit to the developer, that it was worth $4000, and that she expected to be 
paid for it by deriving benefits from an exclusive brokerage contract. 
There was also a finding that the developer knew that the broker 
expected to be paid for her services and to receive the exclusive broker-
age contract. 
§9.4. 1 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.I517.264N.E.2d691. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court, however, held that the broker was not 
entitled to recover from the developer. In arriving at its decision, the 
Court read the master's report as compelling the conclusion that the 
only form of compensation that the broker expected was the award of 
an exclusive brokerage contract. The Court found that the discussions 
concerning such a contract did not constitute an offer or enforceable 
promise and concluded that the conduct of the parties indicated only 
expectations or negotiations that fell short of a binding agreement. 
The Court found expressly that "[ n ]othing which the plaintiff or the 
defendants said or did permits an inference that the defendants agreed 
that if the parties did not enter into a brokerage contract the plaintiff 
would be paid for any services which she performed on her own 
initiative in anticipation of receiving the contract."2 
The plaintiff's brief did not present a claim of unjust enrichment 
or mention the doctrine of quantum meruit but, from the facts dis-
closed in the opinion, there seems to be some Massachusetts authority 
upon which the plaintiff could have based such a claim.3 Moreover, if 
it had been necessary to find an implied promise in order to permit 
recovery in the Oman case, it is submitted that the facts of the case 
may support such an inference. The Court's attention was focused upon 
the exclusive brokerage contract that, it must be admitted, never was 
entered into. The plaintiff, however, was not seeking to enforce such a 
contract; she was seeking compensation based upon an implied prom-
ise of the defendant to compensate her for various services that were 
rendered in reliance on her receiving the exclusive brokerage contract. 
Those services, according to the plaintiff, were of substantial benefit 
to the defendant and were rendered with his knowledge thar she ex-
pected to be paid for them. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, determined that the master's 
report would not support a conclusion that plaintiff expected any 
compensation other than the exclusive brokerage for the shopping 
center. In defense of the Court's decision, it might be said that the 
particular activities of the plaintiff were consistent with mere solicita-
tion for the favor of the defendant so that he would be favorably dis-
posed to the plaintiff and would award her a valuable contract. A 
certain amount of pump-priming and public relations might have 
been the accepted norm in the plaintiff's field of endeavor, and such 
facts could constitute part of the circumstances under which it was 
not unjust for the plaintiff to remain uncompensated. If the Court had 
analyzed the facts with reference to these business principles, the deci-
sion would seem less harsh. 
§9.5. Covenants not to compete: Violation of decree enforcing 
2 Id. at 1520,264 N.E.2dat693-694. 
3 See Duoillette v. Parmenter, 335 Mass. 305, 139 N.E.2d 526 (1957) (unjust enrich-
ment); Casey v. May, 211 Mass. 243, 97 N.E. 913 (1912) (plaintiff, at request of defen-
dant, having rendered valuable services that were not intended to be gratuitous, is 
entitled to reasonable compensation even though no contract exists). In both of the above 
cases, however, the defendants had clearly encouraged the plaintiffs to render the services 
in question. 
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covenant: Damages; Attorney's fees. In Coyne Industrial Laundry of 
Schenectady, Inc. v. Gould, 1 the defendant was appealing from a 
master's decision and a lower court decree that declared him to be in 
contempt of a previous decree that had restrained him from competing 
with the plaintiff by soliciting business from "any person, firm, cor-
poration or agency" served by the plaintif£.2 The defendant was the 
former regional general manager of the plaintiff laundry and had left 
the plaintiff's employ to engage in an identical business in the same 
town in which the plaintiff's regional plant was located. Soon after 
the defendant started his business, the plaintiff sued in equity to en-
force the noncompetition covenant that had been included in the de-
fendant's employment contract, and a consent decree had been entered 
enjoining the defendant from competing for three years. Tlle··aeren-
dant was subsequently low bidder on certain laundry contr.acts with 
the General Services Administration (GSA), a customer of the plain-
tiff, and the plaintiff sued to have the defendant declared in contempt. 
A master heard the case, found the defendant in contempt, and ascer-
tained damages, including attorney's fees, all of which was confirmed 
by the superior court. On appeal, the Supreme Judical Court affirmed 
the lower court decree but modified it as to the amount of damages. 
The defendant urged upon the Court two chief grounds for reversal: 
first, that his conduct had not violated the literal language of the con-
sent decree; and second, that even if the Court might find a violation 
of the decree, the defendant's conduct was not such as constituted 
contempt. He pointed to the terms agency and solicitation in the 
consent decree, arguing that although GSA was concededly a govern-
ment "agency," to read the decree as including such public agencies 
would be unreasonable. It was the defendant's position that the 
covenant not to compete was intended primarily to protect the good-
will established by the former employer's business and to prevent the 
employee from taking advantage of his contacts with the former em-
ployer's customers. The defendant contended that no goodwill or per-
sonal contact was involved in the instant case because GSA awarded 
contracts solely on the basis of impersonal competitive bidding. 
Admittedly, no confidential information, secret formulas, or personal 
relationships had been exploited by the defendant. 
The Court held that it was not unreasonable to include GSA within 
the term agency, especially since GSA was one of the plaintiff's major 
accounts, a fact known to the defendant because in his former capacity 
§9.5. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 587, 268 N.E.2d 848. 
2 The consent decree enjoined the defendant from "calling upon or otherwise solic-
iting ... (for laundry business] from any person, firm, corporation or agency being 
served by Plaintiff on March 22, 1965 in the States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
and in [named counties] in the State of Connecticut for a period of three (3) years from 
November 7, 1964 ... [and] from furnishing such industrial laundry items ... to 
any of the aforesaid persons, firms, corporations or agencies . . . and from furnishing 
in writing or disclosing in any conversation directly or indirectly the names and ad-
dresses or any other information concerning the Plaintiff's customers .... " Id. at 588 
n.2, 268 N.E.2d at 850 n.2. 
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as regional manager he had signed his employer's bids to GSA. It 
was also noted that the noncompetition clause was limited in time to 
three years. The Court's holding indicates that it is not necessary to 
show that each particular restriction in a restrictive covenant is re-
quired to protect confidential information, secret formulas, or per-
sonal relationships, and that the Court will look to the reasonable-
ness of the restrictions as a whole, giving weight to the magnitude of 
the injury involved. 3 The Court also declared that personal contact 
was not an essential element of "solicitation" and that the actions of 
the defendant in submitting a bid to GSA and discussing his plant's 
capabilities was "sufficient 'solicitation' to come within the terms of 
the decree." 
In arguing that contempt ought not to be found, the defendant 
claimed that even if the terms agency and solicitation were held to 
embrace its bid to GSA, those terms were ambiguous and did not 
clearly and unequivocably forbid the defendant's conduct. The 
Court suggested that if the defendant thought the terms ambiguous 
he should have sought judicial clarification. In deciding that the terms 
were not ambiguous and that defendant had properly been held in 
contempt, the Court pointed to the essential facts that GSA was a 
government agency and a customer of the former employer as of the 
date of the decree, and that the defendant had furnished forbidden 
services to GSA when, as to time and place, GSA was within the terms 
of the decree. It is not clear from the Coyne decision whether the same 
result would be reached under the same facts absent the consent decree, 
that is, if only the covenant not to compete were before the Court. 
The defendant attacked the master's findings as to damages on two 
grounds: (l) that the "cash flow" method of computing damages that 
was adopted by the plaintiff and the master was incorrect as a matter 
of law; and (2) that the attorney's fees charged were excessive. The 
master had found that 51.9 percent of the plaintiff's expenses were 
fixed, indirect, overhead charges. He computed damages by adding 
the profits the plaintiff would have received from the contract plus 
the overhead expenses that would have been allocated under cash flow 
accounting methods. Plaintiff relied on F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co. 
v. Hartney, 4 which had upheld a similar computation of damages. 
The Court, however, construed Bartlett narrowly, distinguishing it 
on the ground that in Bartlett the master had specifically found that 
the overhead costs of the injured employer had not been materially 
decreased because of the loss of the purloined customers, nor would 
they have been materially increased had the customers not been pur-
loined. The Court implied that such a finding would be essential 
before overhead expenses could be treated as an element of damages 
under the "so called 'cash flow' theory."5 It was held that the proper 
'For a thorough discussion of employee covenants not to compete, see 1970 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §7.12. 
4 308 Mass. 407,32 N.E.2d 237 (1941). 
5 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.587,593,268N.E.2d848,853. 
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measure of damages was "what the plaintiff would have made had the 
contract been performed." Accordingly, the Court reversed the portion 
of the decision below that awarded overhead expenses. There is no 
reason to doubt that the Court's reasoning could be applied in other 
contexts in which damages for overhead expenses are claimed. The 
lesson for plaintiff's attorneys is clear: evidence must be produced 
and a finding must be made precisely as required by Bartlett if over-
head costs are to be used in the computation of damages. 
Although the defendant had originally protested the imposition of 
attorney's fees as an element of damages, on argument he conceded 
that some fee was due and challenged only the amount being awarded. 
The master had found that the plaintiff's attorney had not handled the 
case "as expeditiously as an experienced trial lawyer," and further-
more that the plaintiff's attorney had charged hourly rates rather 
than per diem rates, the latter being the customary practice in the city 
in question. The Court reaffirmed its position that attorney's fees 
were properly allowable under the instant circumstances, but de-
clared that "strictly conservative principles" would apply in deter-
mining fees to be paid to the winning party by the losing party. 
"[T]he standard is not the same as that applied in an action by an 
attorney against a client with whom he has voluntary contractual 
relations .... "6 Although admitting there was evidence tending to 
show that the amount billed by the plaintiff's attorney was fair and 
reasonable, the Court nonetheless limited the attorney's fee to an 
amount determined at the prevailing per diem rate, which resulted in 
a reduction of 61 percent in the amount recovered for the attorney's fee. 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§9.6. Attorney-client fee agreements: Mdnerney v. Massasoit Grey-
hound Association. 1 Mrs. Elinor Murray, a codefendant in this 
case, consulted attorney Mcinerney on August 17, 1961, regarding her 
marital problems with her husband, the majority stockholder in the 
defendant Massasoit Greyhound Association. After a 10- to 15-minute 
discussion with Mrs. Murray, the plaintiff informed her that he wanted 
to make an agreement with her regarding his compensation for the 
services he was to render. The plaintiff then dictated the first version of 
the fee agreement that formed the basis for this suit. This agreement, 
signed by both parties, provided that Mcinerney was to obtain for 
Mrs. Murray a separate support or divorce decree, a property settle-
ment, and everything else that she was entitled to receive from her 
husband. In return for the plaintiff's services Mrs. Murray agreed to 
pay a reasonable base fee, plus an additional fee equal to one-third of 
the value of everything obtained for her by the plaintiff over and above 
alimony or support payments. 
6 Id. at 595, 268 N.E.2d at 854, citing Hayden v. Hayden, 326 Mass. 587, 596, 96 N.E.2d 
136, 142 (1950). 
§9.6. 1 1971Mass.Adv.Sh.667,269N.E.2d211. 
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From the time the fee agreement was made in 1961 until the spring of 
1964, Mcinerney was required to render very little service to Mrs. Mur-
ray. In June 1964 the plaintiff filed a petition for separate support on 
behalf of Mrs. Murray, and in November 1965, after nine days of trial, 
the plaintiff negotiated a settlement with Mr. Murray's attorney. The 
negotiations resulted in a separate support agreement that provided 
for (a) support payments by Mr. Murray of $20,000 a year, free of taxes, 
(h) purchase of Mrs. Murray's home by Massasoit for $25,000, free of 
taxes, and (c) an immediate payment of $25,000 to Mrs. Murray, which 
sum was to be used to pay Mcinerney for the services he had rendered 
to her. The negotiations also produced an employment agreement that 
provided for Massasoit's employment of Mrs. Murray for life at a rate 
of $7500 per year, and a voting trust agreement was signed that set up 
a trust of 500 shares of Massasoit stock for her benefit. 
In December 1965, after expressing her dissatisfaction with the 
original fee arrangement, Mrs. Murray signed a revised version of the 
original fee agreement. Under the terms of this revised version, Mrs. 
Murray agreed to pay the plaintiff $40,000 for obtaining the $7500 per 
year employment contract. This sum was to be paid by Mrs. Murray at 
a rate of $2000 per year for the rest of her life. In addition, Mrs. Murray 
agreed to transfer to Mcinerney one-third of the Massasoit stock she 
had received in the property settlement. The above arrangements did 
not affect the $25,000 base fee that Mcinerney had already received. 
In May 1967 Mrs. Murray consulted another attorney, who notified 
the plaintiff that Mrs. Murray considered the revised fee agreement 
exorbitant and unreasonable. The other attorney suggested that they 
discuss the matter, but the plaintiff took no action until he was in-
formed that Mrs. Murray had transferred to Massasoit the 500 shares 
of stock in which he claimed a one-third interest. Mcinerney then filed 
a bill for declaratory relief in Suffolk Superior Court, seeking a de-
termination of his rights in 167 shares of Massasoit stock. Mrs. Mur-
ray filed answers and counterclaims denying the validity of the plain-
tiff's claim to the Massasoit stock and charging that his professional 
misconduct should preclude the relief sought. 
The trial judge found that the terms of the 1965 revised fee contract 
would yield a fee of approximately $131,800, depending on how long 
Mrs. Murray lived, and he concluded that the arrangement was 
"champertous, unreasonable and unenforceable."2 The Supreme 
Judicial Court agreed that the fee contract was excessive and unreason-
able as a matter of law, declared the contract null and void, and ordered 
Mcinerney 'to remit everything except the base fee of $25,000.3 This 
holding was embodied in a new final decree, however, because the 
Court concluded that the trial judge's finding of champerty was incor-
rect as a matter of law. 
2 Id. at668, 269 N.E.2dat213. 
3 ld. at 681·682, 269 N.E.2d at 220. Mcinerney was ordered to return to Mrs. Murray 
$2666.56 in monthly installments which she had made on her agreement to pay $2000 
per year for the remainder of her life. The assignment of 167 shares of Massasoit common 
stock to Mcinerney was declared null and void. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/12
192 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §9.6 
In 1961, when the original fee agreement was drafted, the use of 
contingent fees in Massachusetts was governed by the doctrine of 
champerty. The Supreme Judicial Court had defined champerty in an 
1872 decision as "the unlawful maintenance of a suit in consideration 
of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute or some profit out 
of it, whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party's suit at his 
own expense. "4 Hence, any fee agreement was void as champertous 
if it provided for a share of the recovery as the attorney's only compen-
sation for services. However, the Court distinguished those agreements 
for compensation which imposed a personal liability on the client. 
"Where the right to compensation is not confined to an interest in the 
thing recovered, but gives a right of action against the party, though 
pledging the avails of the suit, or a part of them as security for pay-
ment, the agreement is not champertous."5 As a consequence of the 
above distinction, attorneys were able to circumvent the champerty 
restriction by a simple drafting technique. The fee arrangement would 
provide for both a modest fee, to be paid regardless of the outcome of 
the case, and an additional amount measured by a percentage of the 
sum recovered. Such an agreement was not champertous, because the 
set fee constituted a debt from client to attorney and there was a per-
sonal liability between client and attorney for the entire amount.6 
In Mcinerney the original fee agreement provided that Mrs. Murray 
would pay a reasonable fee for her attorney's services, plus a sum equal 
to one-third of everything he obtained for her over and above support 
or alimony payments. The Court decided that under this arrange-
ment the plaintiff was to be paid something for his services regardless 
of the outcome of the libel for divorce or separate support. That in-
debtedness of client to attorney was enough to take the fee contract out 
of the theory of champerty, but the Court made it clear that it pre-
ferred "not to have to rely on this theory in any event."7 
There is an increasingly prevalent practice of charging contingent 
fees. Although contingent fees are susceptible to great abuse, they 
provide also a method for the litigation of meritorious cases by 
litigants of little or no means. Their increasing acceptance in 
principle and the decline of champerty, maintenance, and barratry 
as offences is symptomatic of a fundamental change in society's 
view of litigation .... The doctrine of champerty is thus a tool 
ill fitted to curb the evils attendant upon contingent fees. 8 
Moreover, the Court noted that one of its own rules now permits the 
use of contingent fees.9 Although the original fee contract in Meiner-
4 Scott v. Harmon, 109 Mass. 237, 238 (1872). See also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. ]. 
Mannos and Sons, 287 Mass. 304, 312, 191 N.E. 438, 441 (1934). 
5 Blaisdell v. Ahern, 144 Mass. 393,395, II N.E. 681,684 (1887). 
6 Walsh v. White, 275Mass. 247,248, 175 N.E. 499, 500(1931). 
7 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667,676,269 N.E.2d211, 217. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Mass. S.j.C.R. 3:14, 351 Mass. 795-798 (1967), deals with contingent fees and states, 
in part, that: 
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ney was signed three years before the rule was adopted, the Court felt 
that the rule simply repeated "concepts which have been implicitly 
recognized in our law for many years." It seems apparent that the 
Court was anxious to evaluate the situation in Mcinerney in terms 
of current concepts: "[S.J.C. Rule 3:14] indicates that the standards it 
sets out are meant to replace the old law of champerty." 10 
Although the doctrine of champerty was laid to rest in Mcinerney, 
the Supreme Judicial Court nonetheless agreed with the trial judge 
that the contested fee agreement was excessive and unreasonable. This 
comment will examine some of the criteria which courts have used in 
assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's fee. There are no rigid 
formulas to be applied, for attorneys have been allowed considerable 
latitude in making their own determinations. However, attorneys and 
potential clients should be aware of the extent to which the courts have 
established their own standards of reasonableness and the extent to 
which various professional canons have been interpreted in judicial 
decisions. 
At the outset it should be noted that the issue of reasonableness is 
not affected by the fact that the fee agreement is made before the attor-
ney-client relationship has been established. Such was the fact situation 
in Mcinerney, and the plaintiff attorney pointed out the language of a 
1908 Massachusetts decision: 
[A]n agreement fairly made between attorney and client, before 
. . . [the attorney-client relationship] is entered into, as to the 
compensation to be received by the former for the services which 
it is expected that he will render, is prima facie valid and binds 
the parties to it. 11 
In Mcinerney, however, the Court asserted its power to deny enforce-
ment to any fee agreement it finds to be excessive and unreasonable, 
on the ground that in Massachusetts there is not to be a "complete 
dichotomy between a fee which is reasonable in the light of hindsight 
and one which is permissible at the outset. ... " 12 With no Mas-
"(I) In this rule, the term 'contingent fee agreement' means an agreement, express 
or implied, for legal services of an attorney or attorneys ... , under which compensa-
tion, contingent in whole or in part upon the successful accomplishment or disposition 
of the subject matter of the agreement, is to be in an amount which either is fixed or is to 
be determined under a formula. The term 'contingent fee agreement' shall not include 
an arrangement with a client, express or implied, that the client in any event is to pay 
to the attorney the reasonable value of his services and his reasonable expenses and dis-
bursements. 
"(2) Unless expressly prohibited by this rule, no written contingent fee agreement 
shall be regarded as champertous if made in an effort in good faith reasonably to comply 
with this rule. 
"(3) No contingent fee agreement shall be made (a) in respect of the procuring of an 
acquittal upon or any favorable disposition of a criminal charge, (b) in respect of the 
procuring of a divorce, annulment of marriage or legal separation .... " 
10 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667,676,269 N.E.2d211, 217. 
11 Bar Assn. of Boston v. Hale, 197 Mass. 423,437,83 N.E. 885,886 (1908). 
12 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667,680,269 N.E.2d 211,219. 
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sachusetts case directly on point, the Court adopted the rationale of a 
New York decision: 
It is no less improper for an attorney to take advantage of his 
client's necessities and inexperience to induce him to make a con-
tract in advance to pay an exorbitant fee for services than it is to 
take advantage of those necessities and that inexperience to exact 
an unreasonable fee after the services have been rendered. 13 
In any matter concerning an attorney's conduct, most courts will 
look to the various canons of the American Bar Association, as well as 
to the common law of the particular jurisdiction involved. The ABA 
Code of Professional Responsibility lists a series of factors to be con-
sidered by an attorney when he calculates his fee for services rendered. 14 
The ABA &:_ui~elines are. similar to those established by the 5...YJ2!~me 
Judicial Cour m the leading case of Cummings v. Natzonal Shawmut Blinlf:.. -···· .. - . ...... . .... . 
. . . [a] the ability and reputation of the attorney, [b] the demand 
for his services by others, [ c] the amount and importance of the 
matter involved, [d] the time spent, [e] the prices usually charged 
for similar services by other attorneys in the same neighborhood, 
[f] the amount of money or the value of the property affected by 
controversy, and [g] the results secured. Neither the time spent 
nor any other single factor is necessarily decisive of what is to be 
considered as a fair and reasonable charge for such services. 15 
Most other jurisdictions apply essentially the same criteria as were 
mentioned in Cummings. As a consequence, where there are no Mas-
sachusetts decisions interpreting particular criteria, it is useful to 
examine cases from these other jurisdictions. 
In any case where the reasonableness of an attorney's fee is in ques-
tion, it is a matter to be decided on the facts of P.ach particular case. 16 If 
the attorney brings an action to recover the value of his legal services 
and the client charges that the fee is excessive, the burden is on the 
attorney to prove the reasonableness of his fee. 17 In these instances it 
is proper for the attorney to introduce testimony of other practicing 
13 In re Cohen, 169App. Div. 544,547, 155 N.Y.S. 517, 520(1915). 
14 Disciplinary Rule [hereinafter abbreviated DR] 2-106(B) (1970) states that the 
following are relevant considerations in determining the reasonableness of a fee: 
"(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. 
v "(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular em-
ployment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. 
"(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. 
"(4) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
"(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances. 
"(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
"(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services. 
"(8) Whetherthe fee is fixed or contingent." 
15 284 Mass. 563,569,188 N.E. 489,492 (1933). 
16 McMahon v. Kraph,323 Mass.ll8,124,80N.E.2d314, 318(1948). 
17 Holton v. Denaro,278Mass.261,262,179N.E. 595 (1932). 
13
Doerfer: Chapter 9: Contracts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
§9.6 CONTRACTS 195 
attorneys as to their opinion of what a proper fee would be in the 
specific case. 18 In 1967 this practice was considered in I:if2£ing v. 
l:J!jjlis, where an Illinois appellate court cited with approval the follow-
ing statement from an early Illinois Supreme Court decision: 
What is a fair and reasonable compensation for the professional 
services of a lawyer cannot in many, if not in most cases be other-
wise ascertained than by the opinions of members of the bar, who 
have become familiar by experience and practice, with the char-
acter of such services. Practicing lawyers occupy the position of 
experts as to questions of this nature. 19 
However, the courts are not bound by the testimony of experts in de-
termining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee. In a 1951 antitrust 
case20 involving an award of attorney's fees, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals rejected the expert testimony of attorneys that the services 
in question were worth between $175,000 and $250,000 and reduced 
the district court's allowance from $225,000 to $75,000. The knowledge 
and experience of a particular judge will often render him an indepen-
dent expert in determining the reasonableness of a given fee. 
As noted in Cummings, the ability and reputation of the attorney 
is a primary consideration in determining the reasonableness of a fee. 
The Supreme Judicial Court relied on this criterion in Hale v. Graval-
~~-1 in which the attorney was successful in gaining a---determina-
tion of sanity for his client and arranging for his release from a state 
hospital over the intense opposition of the client's guardian and the 
hospital authorities. The Court concluded that the attorney's skill in 
handling the case was sufficient to justify his fee of $1750. 22 Similarly, 
in a case where the attorney was successful in overturning a precedent 
in deed construction that had been followed for almost 50 years, an 
Illinois court considered the attorney's unusual competency as an 
important consideration in concluding that his fee was not excessive. 23 
In another interesting case, Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. National 
Cranberry Association, althoilgh the attorney had spent only 597 hours 
on a successful private antitrust case and had been a practicing attor-
ney for only seven years, the federal district court nonetheless remarked 
that "the very economy of counsel's methods and his youth are perhaps 
the most significant hallmarks of an outstanding talent" .24 The 
attorney's unusual skill was considered an important factor in justify-
18 Brogna v. Pioneer Petroleum Co., 344 Mass. 382, 386, 182 N.E.2d 303, 306 (1962). 
In this fee case, testimony was admitted from two attorneys, one a specialist in the partic-
ular field of law in question, as to reasonable compensation for the plaintiff attorney's 
services. 
19 83 Ill. App. 2d 384, 389, 227 N.E.2d 797, 799 (1967), citing Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. 
v. Wallace, 136 Ill. 87, 93, 26 N.E. 493, 495 (1891). 
20 Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951 ), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 909 (1952). 
21 340 Mass. 96, 162 N .E.2d 817 (1959). 
" I d. at I 00, 162 N .E.2d at 820. 
23 Hofingv. Willis, 83 Ill. App. 2d 384,227 N.E.2d 797 ( 1967). 
24 119 F. Supp. 242,244 (D. Mass. 1954). 
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ing the allowance of a $35,000 fee. Obviously, however, the attorney's 
evaluation of his own skills will not always justify the fee in question. 
This point was illustrated in McLaughlin v. Old C()lony Trust Co., 25 
in which the attorney contendea-tfiat his abiTity and standing in the 
legal community justified a higher fee than he had received. The Su-
preme Judicial Court concluded that a higher fee was not warranted 
because the evidence presented did not establish either an ability 
greater than that of other attorneys in the area or a greater demand for 
his services than for the services of other competent practitioners in the 
area.26 
An important consideration related to an attorney's overall ability is 
his competency in a specialized area of the law. The Supreme Judicial 
Court considered this factor in B.J:!!lF!!LY-...fJ?..neer Petroleum Co.,27 
where the attorney's services dealt with establishing rates for the sale 
of natural gas. The Court concluded that the attorney "possessed a 
special knowledge in a field of law which peculiarly affected the 
[client's] mterests and in wliii::n'Tew- rawyers are engaged, " 28 and that 
fwor was considered important in assessing the appropriate value 
of the services rendered. On the other hand, the attorney's unique 
ability or knowledge would not appear to be a proper consideration 
where the particular case does not require such special talents. This 
point was illustrated in a 1951 case29 in which an attorney in an anti-
trust action contended that his special knowledge of the movie indus-
try was essential to the successful prosecution of the case and justified 
a commensurately higher fee. The federal court of appeals, in rejecting 
this contention, concluded that the attorney's special knowledge of the 
industry was not vital to the case, and that any competent trial lawyer 
could have prepared and tried the case. 30 It would appear that an 
attorney's specialization ina field of law should justify a significantly 
_higher fee only when the case could not be handled competently by an 
attorney who did not have the particular expertise. The measure of an 
attorney's ability and knowledge is certainly a valid consideration in 
determining the reasonableness of his fee, but if the fee is challenged in 
litigation the attorney must be prepared to introduce evidence of his 
ability and of his standing among his colleagues. The attorney may 
encounter certain proof problems regarding these factors, but it would 
seem that expert testimony of other attorneys would be particularly 
valuable. 
Another consideration highly relevant in determining the reason-
ableness of a fee is the difficulty of the legal issues and other matters 
involved in a given case. The Slipreme]Udic1al Court agreed with this 
2s 313 Mass. 329,47 N.E.2d276(1943). 
26 I d. at 336, 4 7 N .E.2d at 280. 
27 344 Mass. 382, 182 N .E.2d303 (1962). 
28 I d. at 386, 182 N.E.2d at 306. 
29 Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1%1), cerl. denied, 
342 U.S. 909 (1952). 
30 I d. at 570-571. 
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proposition in Muldoon v. West End Chevrolet, Inc., 31 a complicated 
tax case. A better illt1st~tion of th-~ -use of this criterion is Hofing, 
where the a-tu;rney~ case depended upon the interpretation of two 
deeds that raised difficult legal questions involving-deea construction 
anaa1iernate contingent remainders. Another interesting example of 
a court's delving into the difficulty of a case is Highway Truck Drivers 
Local 107 v. Cohen. 32 The attorney in that 'case--was successful in 
oot-alning an injunction enjoining expenditures from a union treasury 
to pay counsel fees for the defense of four union officials charged with 
defrauding the union. The federal District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania noted that the case was one of first impression 
under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,33 and 
this fact was considered important in assessing the attorney's fee. 34 
As the preceding cases illustrate, the difficulty of the legal matters 
involved has been used to justify a higher fee. However, a higher fee 
will not be sustained where the case does not involve novel or difficult 
issues or where the necessary pretrial work is not so complex. In 
Mcinerney, the Supreme Judicial Court did not regard the intricacies 
of representing the client at a support hearing as sufficient to justify 
the high fee charged by the attorney. A similar case, which involved 
the awarding of attorney's fees in a divorce action, is Silton v. Silton, 
in which the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that an awarcCoi $3-ooo 
was excessive where the trial lasted only three days and the issues pre-
sented were not especially difficult.35 In T_wr:ntieth Century-Fox Film 
(;orp .. v. Brooksid_e Theatre Corp., 36 the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals limited an attorney's fee in a civil antitrust action because a 
previous criminal antitrust prosecution of the defendants had effec-
tively established a prima facie case against them, thereby leaving the 
amount of damages as the only real issue in dispute. It would appear 
that the difficulty of the legal issues, absent other factors, will justify 
a higher fee only in situations involving particularly complicated or 
unique legal problems. The bulk of the cases handled by most attor-
neys would not come within such bounds. 
Another of the Cummings criteria concerns the amount of money 
or the value of the property involved in the case. It has been said that 
"where the amount involved in a case is substantial, the attorney 
assumes more responsibility when he undertakes to handle the matter 
... and for such additional responsibilities, the lawyer is entitled to 
additional compensation."37 However, the Supreme Judicial Court 
in Mcinerney noted that although the amount involved was large, 
3I 338 Mass. 91, 96, 153 N.E.2d887, 891 (1958). 
32 220F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
'' 29 U .S.C. §501(b). 
34 See also Cape Cod Food Products, Inc, v. National Cranberry Assn., 119 F. Supp. 242 
(D. Mass. 1954), where the difficulty of the legal issues in a particular antitrust action was 
considered by the court. 
35 352 Mass. 299, 300-301, 225 N .E.2d 320, 321 ( 1967). 
36 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942 ( 1952). 
37 Hofingv. Willis, 83 III. App. 2d384, 388,227 N.E.2d 797,799 (1967). 
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this factor alone did not justify a higher fee, since the case was neither 
intricate nor especially difficult and the actual services rendered by 
the attorney did not justify the claimed fee. 38 A similar point of view 
was expressed in Young v. Young, 39 where a trial judge had awarded 
$7000 to the wife faraii:orney's- fees in a divorce action. The husband's 
assets were over $1 million, and the wife claimed that the $7000 award 
for attorney's fees were inadequate. The Michigan Supreme Court 
disagreed, concluding that although "the amount involved was some-
what larger than in the ordinary divorce case, [this fact] did not 
necessarily . . . increase the work required or enlarge the rather 
elementary legal principles involved."40 In cases where the amount 
of money involved actually does create additional work and respon-
sibility for the attorney, a higher fee may well be justified; but where 
he performs a relatively routine service, the fact that the case involves 
a large amount of money should not itself warrant additional compen-
sation. 
In determining the reasonableness of a particular fee, the Supreme 
Judicial Col!n in.lHair. y, folumbian Firepn_Jojjr~,g _f~- considered the 
lacrtTlaiaCceptance of the par't1ciilar employment by the attorney may 
preclude other employment: 
The attorney, by his engagement, gives up the possibility of 
being employed by the adverse party in the very matter to which 
the [employment] relates, and the matter may be of such a kind 
that he gives up the possibility of being employed by others in 
... [related] matters in which employment would be adverse to 
the interest in which he is retained.41 
• 1 t .· However, Blair was decided in 1906, and there have been no subse-
1 ~l--M~s-~;;u;:busetts cases_ ir1ynicll this "lost _ employlll_~nt" factor 
has been discussed. Similarly, there are few decisions in other juris-
'"' diCtions involving this factor, although both California and Illinois 
have in recent years listed it among the relevant criteria used in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a particular fee. 42 The ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility also includes among,the criteria justifying 
a particular fee "[ t ]he likelihood, if apparent to the client, ?that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclii(fe-otlier employ-
ment by the lawyer."43 In Blair the Court seemed to limit its attention 
to the possible loss of employment due to potential conflict of interest 
38 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667, 679, 269 N.E.2d 211, 219. In a case in which an attorney's 
services dealt with determining the validity of amendments to a trust instrument, the 
Supreme Judicial Court refused to declare the attorney's fee excessive where the record 
of the lower court decision contained no statement of the value of the trust. Phelps v. 
State Street Trust Co., 330 Mass. 511, 115 N.E.2d 382 (1953). 
39 354 Mich. 254,92 N.W.2d328(1958). 
40 Id. at258, 92 N.W.2dat330. 
41 191 Mass. 333,336,77 N.E. 762,763 (1906). 
42 Hofing v. Willis, 83 Ill. App. 2d 384, 389, 227 N.E.2d 797, 800 (1967); Fernandez 
v. Fernandez, 194 Cal. App. 2d 782, 800, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374, 385 (1961). 
43 DR2-106(B)(2) (1970). 
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problems, but the ABA guideline would be equally relevant in situa-
tions where the amount of time devoted to a particular case precludes 
the acceptance of other clients. However, the lawyer would have to 
show that the employment in issue did in fact prevent him from ac-
cepting other employment and that the client was aware of this fact. 
It is not clear whether the client would have to be aware of the specific 
lost opportunity or the likely dollar effect of the lost opportunity on 
the fee he will be charged. In practical terms, only a small percentage 
of an attorney's work would seem to be affected by such loss of employ-
ment. 
In declaring attorney Mcinerney's fee unreasonable, the Supreme 
Judicial Court understandably placed considerable emphasis on the 
amount of time that he had expended on the case. The gme spent by 
an attorney is proba_hly_ the _most basic element in evaluating the reason-
ableness of a particular fee, but as Cummings clearly established, 
"[n]either the time spent nor any other single factor is necessarily 
decisive of what ... [constitutes] a fair and reasonable charge for 
[legal] services."44 In Cummings, an attorney was employed to collect 
a $160,000 promissory note that a bank had been unable to collect, and 
he negotiated a settlement for complete payment. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court found the attorney's fee of $5600 to be reasonable in light 
of the relevant criteria the Court cited, despite the fact that the fee 
greatly exceeded any computation based solely on a hourly rate. 
Similarly, in 0!:J!f!_9_o~d_ Food Products, the federal District Court for 
Massachusetts examineathe services rendered by the attorney, the 
difficulty of the case, and the ability of the attorney, and concluded 
that the fee was reasonable despite the fact that it was higher than if it 
had been keyed to an hourly rate. 
When considering the time expended on a given case, some courts 
have acknowledged that an experienced attorney can often accomplish 
the same task in less time than his less experienced counterpart. There 
is no Massachusetts case that clearly articulates this premise, but in 
Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., where the attorney repres~nted a suc-
cessful cheiif in an action under the federal securities laws, a federal 
district court in New York concluded that "[t]he fact that [the attorney 
had] been the attorney in very similar cases and, therefore, hadto do 
fess work in preparing for this case, . . . should not in any way 
prejudice his claim for fees. Expertise in a field of law should be re-
warded rather than be used as a basis for fee reduction."45 Conversely, 
rio client should be expected to pay a fee based on a strict hourly rate 
44 284 Mass. 563, 569, 188 N.E. 489, 492 (1933). See also Highway Truck Drivers 
Local 107 v. Cohen, 220 F. Supp. 735, 738 (E.D. Pa. 1963), where the court stated that 
the number of hours expended by the attorney on the case is not "determinative of what 
the fee should be, for the work of a lawyer is not comparable to the work of an artisan 
such as a plumber, ... where the time clock approach is controlling. Many times the 
final and winning decision of the lawyer as to what should or should not be done is not 
made at his desk or in his library, but when he is elsewhere. The conscientious lawyer's 
mind is never at rest. ... " 
•s 254F.Supp. 617, 620(S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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when the attorney's use of time is inefficient. This point is exempli-
fied in Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, lnc., 46 a 1969 antitrust case in 
which the attorneys asRed f162",-43~-for rheir services, based solely on 
a hourly charge. This amount was ruled excessive and was reduced to 
$70,000, partly because the case was considered overprepared and be-
cause there was duplication of effort among the attorneys involvedY 
Another example of an attorney's poor use of time can be seen in 
Cirimele v. Shinaz1, 48 in which the attorney represented a landlord 
m an acuon to-recover rent under a lease that provided that the tenant 
would pay a reasonable attorney's fee in any such action. The plain-
tiff contended that the court's determination of the fee was inadequate 
since considerable legal work was caused by the defendant's success-
ful change of venue motion. However, a California appellate court 
concluded that the attorney had brought the extra work upon himself 
by filing the landlord's action in a district where neither party lived. 
"The reasonable attorney fee . . . is not necessarily gauged by legal 
semces'actually rendered: It (s limite~- t.q r~~-~QllEt_b_l~_c:~~~I1S;:tt~Of1J9r 
legal services that are reasona_hly_necessary unde.r_ __ ~cucumstances 
of a case."49 Afihougli-C[izmele dealt with payment of the attorney's 
fees under a clause in a lease, the standard enunciated by the court 
would appear to be relevant in any situation where the attorney bases 
his fee on the amount of time spent on the case. In any situation w~re 
the attorney's i1_1~ffidency__gr error inc;;n:~fl.§es the aii}.9JJ!H Qf. time ex-
P.!I19_ed'Ona·case, the client should not be expected to underwrlte'tlie 
added cost. · · ·· - · --- ··· - · · ·· --- ···· · 
·B-oth Cummings and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 
provide that the result secured for the client by the attorney is a11other 
Eoper measure-of the reasonableness of the attqrney's fee.50 This 
cnfeiion was applied in Muldoon, where the attorney represented his 
client before the Internal Revenue Service in 1958 and was successful 
in reducing his client's liability from $105,000 to about $15,000. The 
Supreme Judicial Court refused to find the attorney's fee of $7600 ex-
cessive and emphasized the importance of the result secured in the case: 
"It would be naive to deny that the fact and degree of success are im-
portant factors in determining the value of legal services to a client."51 
However, the fact that a client receives a large financial benefit from 
t'ii'e"Case will not automaticaBy justify a higher fee. Iii "Mcinerney the 
Court considere<rffiinx~iiefits -obtained for-the client and concluded 
that "[w]ith respect to the property settlement, since [Mr.] Murray 
was comfortably well off it is not surprising nor any particular tribute 
to the plaintiff that the settlement amounted to enough to leave [Mrs. 
Murray] in comfortable circumstances."52 The Court's conclusion m 
46 299F. Supp.1080(D. Md.l969). 
47 Id. at 1100. 
48 134Cal. App. 2d50, 285 P.2d311 (1958). 
49 I d. at 52,285 P.2dat312. 
50 284Mass. 563,569, 188 N.E. 489,492 (1933); DR2-106(B) (1970), n.14supra. 
51 338Mass.91,96-97, 153N.E.2d887,892(1955). 
52 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667,679,269 N.E.2d211, 219. 
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Mcinerney implies that where the result secm~d is ;:!tt_ribJitable more 
t(i=~tl_~~ ~ir.~~Il_l_~t'!n~~s of the-case than--i(i -.the -att~.ney's effori.s, --the 
financial benefit to the client will not of itself justify a higher fee. On 
tfie otliernaiia;·a: party who wishes to litigate miistbe prepared to pay 
the reasonable costs of litigation, regardless of the fact and degree of 
success. In Palumbo v. United States Rubber Co.,53 the client in-
structed his attorney to.\iridertake considerab1e work in a case where 
the princip_~e_involved was important buJ ~he amount of money in-
volved was srriall. The Rhode-ISland Supreme Court conCluded that 
the client "cannot after the fact object to the charge for legal services 
on the ground that it is·disproportionate both to the amount involved 
in the controversy and to the number of dollars collected."54 
An()ther of the Cummi~g~ c::Iiteria looks to theprices usually charged 
forslmilar services by other attorneysm the- sam£arei""A.lih0ugh this 
Siaii-daio-is rriei11ionea· in1vlcinerney~--- there is no recent Massachusetts 
case clearly illustrating its application. A good example is provided 
by Perlman v. Feldmann,55 a case in which attorneys from New York 
and Connecticut appeared for stockholders in a lengthy stockholders 
derivative action. In determining the reasonableness of the fees, the 
federal district court considered "the prevailing hourly rates of pay 
for attorneys of different degrees of skill, experience and standing 
both in Connecticut and New York during the years of the pendency 
of the [action] .... "56 Another case in point is Milll!f!"uke_e T_9__wne.,. ~Y·', 
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc.,57 referred to earlier with respect to the unique ' 
cThlTi'fy-of ari attorney and the effect of expert testimony in fee cases. 
The plaintiff's attorneys in that case, having represented an indepen-
dent theaief·owner against a motion picture distributor in a successful 
antitrust suit, had been allowed $225,000 in fees by a federal district 
court. The COJlft qf app~al~. in deciding that the fee was excessive and 
sJ;!Ql,ll~Lbe. reduce<ltQ J~.75,ooo, placed considerable emphasis. on-the 
fact that the allowance by the district court was far in excess of the 
amounts ordinarily(11arged in the surrounding area. If was noted that 
experienced trial lawyers in the area could be employed at approxi-
mately $40 per hour, with the usual charge for assisting counsel at $20 
per hour, while the allowance of the district court approached $100 
per hour for all time spent (by the leading counsel and his two assis-
tants). In any litigation involving the reasonableness of a fee, it would 
appear that evidence showing that an attorney's fees are commensurate 
with those charged by other attorneys in the same locale with similar 
ability, experience, and reputation would be quite persuasive in jus-
tifying the fee. 
The preceding discussion has focused on the various criteria set 
forth in Cummings for determining the reasonableness of a particular 
fee. A relativel)' new factor that must be considered in the attorney's 
~---······-··-------~-- ... -·-·-----~----~--~·- - --··-· -·-- - .. --···-···· ----·----.....~------
5' 102 R.L 220,229 A.2d 620 (1967). 
54 Id. at225, 229A.2dat623. 
55 160F.Supp.3IO(D.Conn.l958). 
56 I d. at 311. 
57 190 F.2d561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909(1952). 
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fee context is the establishment of recommended minimum fee sched-
wes:-'the Supreme Judicial Court has not delineated the effect of 
tlle'se schedules in Massachusetts. In analyzing the reasonableness of a 
fee, courts in other jurisdictions have compared the specific fee in 
question with the figure recommended in the minimum fee schedule 
and have considered this comparison in reaching a decision.58 How-
ever, the minimum fee schedules have not been treated as mandatory 
or binding. 59 In C..!.!!!:E!.E~_v.: Sat~:!!:_~'fl;ty,60 a Wisconsin attorney con-
tended that the fee allowed him as the court-appointed counsel in a 
criminal case was inadequate because it was less than the minimum 
fee recommended for such services by the state bar association. In re-
jecting this contention, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: 
The schedule of minimum fees of the State Bar or other bar 
associations constitutes only the collective judgment of the com-
mittees or groups that passed upon it as to a scale of fees generally 
fair for the types of services listed. They are some evidence relevant 
to the question of a reasonable charge for services, but have no 
other legal force. 61 
It has also been e~Jl<J.~ized that the rates_ set out in minimum fee sched-
~~es are "minir;'}!!!l! t~tes ann are-~pp~icable only wh~n no _!lnu~ual 
/ R~oblems are mvo!vJ:~d. "62 The cntena enumerated m Cummzngs 
( provide a more reliable standard for evaluating the reasonableness of 
\ a particular fee than do the minimum fee schedules, since the Cummings 
standards are more flexible and can more readily be adapted to specific 
fact situations. 
T~e._!~~t t~at contingen~ f,e~s .<lr~-- I!~~~ ~e~eral}y permitteci in Mas-
achusetts presents several points for an attorney to consider in es-
tablishing a fee arrangement with his client. The ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility recommends that where a client can afford 
to pay a reasonable fixed fee, the attorney should avoid basing his fee 
on a contingent arrangement. 53 However, many clients, even if able to 
pay a fixed fee, prefer a contingent agreement.64 The code also states 
that such an arrangement is not improper if the client, "after being 
fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that arrangement. " 65 The 
< use of contingent fees is now prohibited in domestic relations cases in ~-----·· . ·--····--- . -... - .. . - -------·-·--- ..•. -- - ..• ---·--·-··-····---·-·-····--------·····-· . 
58 Perlman v. Feldmann, 160 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1958). In a case where three 
attorneys performed services in the administration of an estate, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the fee was equal to the mini-
mum hourly rate recommended by the local bar association and concluded that their fee 
was a reasonable one. In re Browarsky, 437 Pa. 282, 286, 263 A.2d 365, 366 (1970). 
59 Krieger v. Colby, 106 F. Supp. 124, 132 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Hunker v. Melugin, 74 
N.M. 116, 123, 391 P.2d 407, 411 (.1964). 
60 19Wis. 2d599,120N.W.2d671 (1963). 
6t Id.at604,120N.W.2dat675. 
62 Hofingv. Willis, 83 Ill. App. 2d384, 388,227 N.E.2d 797, 799(1967). 
63 Ethical Consideration [hereinafter abbreviated EC] 2-20 ( 1970). 
64 MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services 205 ( 1964). 
65 EC2-20(1970). 
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Massachusetts. 66 In Mcinerney, the Court stated that this prohibition 
"isoased on [the] fear that such arrangements act as an inducement to 
divorce and as an obstacle to the court's duty to set up an equitable 
property settlement as among the parties to the marriage and any 
children."67 Similarly, the use of contingent fees is not permitted in 
criminal casesin Massachusetts.68 The rationale for this prohibition 
isexpressea in the code: "Public policy properly condemns contingent 
fee arrangements in criminal cases, largely on the ground that legal 
services in criminal cases do not produce a res [recovery] with which 
to pay the fee." 69 
In Massachusetts, Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:14 provides that 
the reasonableness of a contingent fee shall be determined "in the light 
of the circumstances prevailing at the time of making such agreement, 
including the uncertainty of the compensation and all other relevant 
factors." 7° Courts in other jurisdictions have taken the view that a 
larger fee will be authorized where payment depends completely upon 
the fact and degree of success, as distinguished from the case where the 
attorney is to be paid whether he is successful or not. 71 One court has 
stressed the risk factor thusly: "Great weight is given to the contingent 
nature of fees with the accompanying risk that the ... labor and the 
substantial overhead and expense might go for naught. ... " 72 
Because the contingent fee will often be higher than a fixed fee in a 
similar case due to the uncertainty of the compensation, a contingent 
fee should not be used as a standard by attorneys or the courts in deter-
mining the reasonable value of services in a similar case under a non-
contingent fee agreement. 73 This potential for a higher fee under a 
contingent fee arrangement should be explained to the client before 
any such arrangement is adopted. 
Any attorney attempting to collect a fee from a recalcitrant client 
should remember the standard of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity: 
A lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid controversies 
over fees with clients and should attempt to resolve amicably any 
differences on the subject. He should not sue a client for a fee un-
less necessary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client. 74 
In Mcinerney, the Court placed considerable emphasis on this standard 
in discussing the conduct of the attorney, thereby clearly indicating 
its intention to have ~he standard adhered to in Massachusetts. 
66 Mass. S.].C.R. 3:14(3)(b), n.9supra. 
67 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667,677,269 N.E.2d 211,218. 
68 Mass. S.J.C.R. 3:14(3)(a), n.9supra. 
69 EC 2-20 (1970). 
7o S.J.C.R. 3:14(6), 351 Mass. 797 (1967). 
"Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Del. 1966); 
Buckley v. Surface Transp. Corp., 277 App. Div. 224, 226, 98 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (1950). 
72 Perlman v. Feldmann, 160 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1958). 
"Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co.,251 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Del. 1966). 
74 EC2-23 (1970). 
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The Mcinerney decision makes it clear that all attorney fee arrange-
ments are subject to review by the courts. However, the absolute value 
of legal services cannot be computed with mathematical certainty. Like 
the standard of the reasonable man in tort law, the standard which is 
used to determine the reasonableness of an attorney's fee is a broad one 
that depends upon many variables. The attorney's fee must be con-
sidered in relation to the specific fact situation of the case and in con-
sonance with all the relevant criteria· found in Cummings and the 
Code of Professional Responsibility. 
The matter of a proper fee is a decision which must be ultimately 
made by the individual attorney, considering both the practical and 
ethical problems involved. The lawyer must set fees sufficient to pro-
vide an adequate standard of living for himself and his family. Also, 
adequate compensation is necessary if the attorney is to serve his 
clients properly and preserve the integrity and independence of the 
bar. 75 It has been said that "[ u ]nless excellence in the trial lawyer is 
properly recompensed, the best men will not spend their time in court, 
and thus there will dry up the most essential sources of an independent 
bar. " 76 On the other hand, an attorney "should not charge more than 
a reasonable fee, for excessive cost of legal service would deter laymen 
from utilizing the legal system in protection of their rights ... [and 
would abuse] the professional relationship between lawyer and cli-
ent."77 The individual attorney must remain aware that he is an offi-
cer of the court and that his profession is an aspect of the administra-
tion of justice. 
DoNALD A. ToBIN 
75 EC2-17 (1970). 
76 Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. National Cranberry Assn., 119 F. Supp. 242, 244 
(D. Mass. 1954). 
n EC2-17(1970). 
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